Much attention has been paid to ‘deictic shifts’ in Ancient Greek literary texts. In this article I show that similar phenomena can be found in documentary texts. Contracts in particular display unexpected shifts from the first to the third person or vice versa. Rather than constituting a narrative technique, I argue that such shifts should be related to the existence of two major types of stylization, called the ‘objective’ and the ‘subjective’ style. In objectively styled contracts, subjective intrusions may occur (...) as a result of the scribe temporarily assuming himself to be the deictic center, whereas in subjectively styled contracts objective intrusions may occur as a result of the contracting parties dictating to the scribe, and the scribe not modifying the personal references. There are also a couple of texts which display more extensive deictic alter­nations, which suggests that generic confusion between the two major types of stylization may have played a role. (shrink)

This is the first volume in the Amsterdam edition of the Latin texts of Erasmus of Ordo IV which comprises works on moral issues. It presents the panegyric of Philip the Fair , the father of Charles V, and the Education of Princes . Both works equally instruct princes how to behave morally. The third work in this volume treats language and praises the Word of God.

Commentaries on Aristotle's writings have been produced since the 2nd century AD. This edition contains Greek commentaries on his work from the 3rd to the 8th centuries AD by, among others, Alexander of Aphrodiensias, Themistios, Joh. Philoponus, Simplicius in Greek.

Commentaries on Aristotle's writings have been produced since the 2nd century AD. This edition contains Greek commentaries on his work from the 3rd to the 8th centuries AD by, among others, Alexander of Aphrodiensias, Themistios, Joh. Philoponus, Simplicius in Greek.

Indice - Fonti. - Premessa. - Presentazione. - I Analogia. - II Consuetudine e fatto normativo. - III Diritto (I). - IV Diritto (II). - V Lacune del diritto. - VI Logica giuridica (I). - VII Logica giuridica (II). - VIII Marxismo e diritto. - IX Metodo. - X Norma. - XI Norma giuridica. - XII Norme secondarie. - XIII Obbligo giuridico. - XIV Principi generali di diritto. - XV Ragionamento giuridico. - XVI Ragione e diritto. - XVII Sanzione. - (...) XVIII Scienza giuridica. (shrink)

In IV, xvii, 19–22 of his Essay, Locke employs Latin labels for four kinds of argument, of which one (ad hominem) was already in circulation and one (ad judicium) has never had much currency. The present proposal seeks to locate and clarify what Locke was aiming to describe, and to contrast what he says with some subsequent uses that have been made of these labels as if they named fallacies. Though three of the four kinds of argument that Locke picks (...) out are often less than decisive, he casts no aspersion on the legitimacy of their use in debate. (shrink)

Augustine's Confessions is one of the most influential and most innovative works of Latin literature. Written in the author's early forties in the last years of the fourth century AD, they reflect on his life and on the activity of remembering and interpreting a life. Books I–IV are concerned with infancy and learning to talk, school days, sexual desire and adolescent rebellion, intense friendships and intellectual exploration. Augustine evolves and analyses his past with all the resources of the reading which (...) shaped his mind: Virgil and Cicero, Neoplatonism and the Bible. This edition, which aims to be usable by students who are new to Augustine, alerts readers to the verbal echoes and allusions of Augustine's brilliant and varied Latin, and explains his theological and philosophical questioning of what God is and what it is to be human. (shrink)

Ubi Varro de uilla rustica facienda agit, de culina haec monet: in primis culina uidenda ut sit admota, quod ibi hieme antelucanis temponbus aliquot res conficiuntur, cibus paratur ac capitur. Hunc locum legentes sponte nosmet ipsos rogamus, quid sibi uelit illud admota. ‘Prope cellam uilici,’ inquit Keilius , de qua paulo ante sermo est: uilici proximum ianuam cellam esse oportet eumque scire, qui introeat aut exeat noctu quidue ferat, praesertim si ostianus eat nemo. Sed si locum ita interpretamur, (...) quomodo intellegenda est sententia, quae sequitur, causalis: quod ibi hieme cet. ? Num uilicus in cella iacens uel sedens moderari debebat opera, quae mane in culina fiebant ? An idcirco culinam proximam cellae uilici esse oportebat, ut inter utramque paruum spatium interesset, si uilicus ab altera ad alteram commeare uellet ? Et hoc et illud uix credibile est Varronem significare uoluisse. (shrink)

VBI Varro de uilla rustica facienda agit, de culina haec monet: in primisculina uidenda ut sit admota, quod ibi hieme antelucanis temporibus aliquot res conficiuntur, cibus paratur ac capitur. Hunc locum legentes sponte nosmet ipsos rogamus, quid sibi uelit illud admota. ‘Prope cellam uilici,’ inquit Keilius , de qua paulo ante sermo est: uilici proximum ianuam cellam esse oportet eumque scire, qui introeat aut exeat noctu quidue ferat, praesertim si ostiarius est nemo. Sed si locum ita interpretamur, quomodo (...) intellegenda est sententia, quae sequitur, causalis: quod ibi hieme cet.? Num uilicus in cella iacens uel sedens moderari debebat opera, quae mane in culina fiebant ? An idcirco culinam proximam cellae uilici esse oportebat, ut inter utramque paruum spatium interesset, si uilicus ab altera ad alteram commeare uellet? Et hoc et illud uix credibile est Varronem significare uoluisse. Accedit, quod in uilla rustica culina non prope ianuam est, sed in parte interiore cohortis, quemadmodum docent fundamenta aperta uillae rusticae Pompeianae , et probatur uerbis Vitruuii , qui ita praecipit: ‘in corte culina quam calidissimo loco designetur.’ Quae cum ita se habeat, apud Varronem legendum esse puto: in primis culina uidenda ut sit admota, h.e.ad meridiem spectans . Nam si ita legimus, neque admota suo caret datiuo,1 et perspicuum fit, quid sententia causalis quod ibi hieme cet. sibi uelit. Diligenti enim domino ‘prouidendum’ est, ‘familia ubi uersetur, si fessi opere aut frigore aut calore, ubi commodissime possint se quiete reciperare’ . Talis dominus etiam curabit, ut ‘hieme antelucanis temporibus’ serui ‘aliquot res conficere et cibum parare et capere’ possint loco calidissimo uillae , sed situe hie locus longe an prope a cella uilici, nihil ad rem pertinet. (shrink)

In his refutation of skepticism in book IV of De rerum natura, Lucretius uses argumentative methods typical of Epicurus: the περιτροπή is in many ways similar to that used by the philosopher in book XXV of Περὶ φύσεως, the same book where, in a passage dedicated to the criticism against determinists, can be found a reference to the criterion of the πρόληψις, that Lucretius exploits in his refutation. Moreover, Lucretius develops a strong demonstration concerning the irrefutability of αἴσθησις as a (...) criterion of truth, which finds significant points of contact with a large fragment, transmitted by Diogenes Laertius and generally traced back to the Canon of Epicurus. The last argument used by the poet is a pragmatic one: for the skeptic it would be impossible to live. The argument is similar to the praxis-based argument used by Epicurus in the Περὶ φύσεως against the partisans of determinism. But the pragmatic argument goes back to a very ancient layer of anti-skeptical polemics, even prior to Epicurus and already present in book Γ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Although later influences cannot be excluded, Lucretius appears to be a faithful witness of Epicurus. Probably in a lost section of the Περὶ φύσεως, the philosopher of Samos showed positions going against skeptical or proto-skeptical attitude, contemporary or earlier to the time of the philosopher, probably developed in a Democritean or a Socratic context. Epicurus’ ad hominem strategy is very close to that of the philosopher in the Principal Doctrines XXIII–XXV, and certainly follows Aristotle’ strategy in book Γ of Metaphysics against those who deny the principle of non-contradiction. In a similar way, Epicurus does not have one figure as the objective of his refutation but constructs a hypothetical dialectical opponent capable of embodying a series of philosophical tendencies judged by the founder of Kepos to be extremely dangerous not only for the correct exercise of thought but for the human being’s life itself. (shrink)

One of the most important issues for the ideal transmission of hadith texts and isnāds is that there is no error in the writing of these expressions. For this purpose, it is seen that the hadith scholars try to create an awareness about the mistakes in the hadiths and the names of the narrators and try to minimize the mistakes by writing works. The most important examples of this literature seems to have been given in IV. /X century. In this (...) study, the reasons for the increase in the literature of hadith taṣḥīf in the IV./X century will be tried to be analyzed periodically and regionally. When the reasons for this increase are taken into consideration, it can be stated that the main factors come to the fore as the active transmission of works in the relevant period, the development of narrator literature, the decline in the profile of the narrator in this century, and the need of the Ahl al-Hadith living in the ʿAd̲j̲am regions on the subject. It is seen that the hadith scholars’ special requests from Arabic language experts for writing works also affected the formation of taṣḥīf literature. Their display of such an attitude is also important in terms of pointing out the existence of inter-scientific communication and a self-criticism about incompetent fields. (shrink)

This volume completes the Oxford Classical Text of Lucian by adding eleven works of the Lucianic corpus proper, four other works wrongly attributed to Lucian in a few manuscripts, and those epigrams from the Anthologies which have any claim to be regarded as Lucianic.

In EN II, 1108 9-1108 b10 e più estesamente in EN IV, 1126b 10-1128b 9 Aristotele analizza tre virtù (amichevolezza, sincerità e arguzia) che, coinvolgendo il linguaggio e il senso dell’umorismo, riguardano quell’aspetto fondamentale della natura umana che è la socialità, al punto che pare giustificato l’utilizzo dell’etichetta “virtù sociali” per riferirsi ad esse. Tali virtù, infatti, rappresentano le eccellenze nell’ambito dei rapporti sociali non connotati da affetto e amicizia, ma caratterizzati da un legame ben definito, sufficiente a giustificare l’emergere (...) di virtù peculiari. Questo legame è la cittadinanza: la comune appartenenza a una stessa città genera una frequentazione che, per quanto formale o comunque non sentimentalmente connotata, è opposta all’estraneità. C’è un fine comune che regge la polis, in forza del quale ogni estraneità è vinta, e di cui l’amichevolezza reciproca, l’esigenza di una veridicità nei rapporti, e persino la moderazione ironica nello scherzare e nel fare battute sono segno inequivocabile. Aristotele pertanto tematizza una sfera ben precisa dei rapporti sociali, e ne stabilisce le eccellenze: ciò significa che questa sfera ha una sua specificità e consistenza e di conseguenza anche che questo gruppo di virtù ha una sua autonomia. (shrink)

In developing the concept of assemblages, Gilles Deleuze draws at least some inspiration from Gilbert Simondon’s concept of information. While his acknowledgement of Simondon’s influence is almost entirely positive, Deleuze explicitly distances himself from the concept of information in order to avoid its link to the field of cybernetics. However, a Deleuzian informational ontology could instead be leveraged as an alternative to cybernetics. Drawing on the Spinozan link between the work of Deleuze and Simondon, it is possible to develop a (...) hybrid informational ontology. This system can not only offer a different approach to information, data and technology than the essentialist concept of information embraced by cybernetics, but also aligns well with recent research in the biological sciences that has disrupted a long-held concept of individuals as entirely separate and autonomous. Shifting away from the Platonic Form to a Deleuzian/simondonian in-formation furthers the post-human project aimed at understanding processes of subjectivation at multiple scales, including the micro and macro. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:125, HUME'S PROBABILITY ARGUMENT OF?,??,? In the Treatise,?,??,?, Hume presents an follows:' argument which, in the barest of outlines, goes as 1 (Pl) Every proposition has a probability less than one. (P2) If reason were the basis of our beliefs, then we would have no beliefs. (follows from (Pl)) (P3) We in fact do have beliefs. Hence, (P4) Reason is not the basis of our beliefs. The argument has (...) not been particularly well received. D. C. Stove, for example, refers to it as being "not merely defective, but one of the worst 2 arguments ever to impose itself on a man of genius." While not everyone is as unsympathetic as Stove, it nonetheless is difficult to find commentators favorably disposed toward the argument. Various sections of the Treatise are notoriously unclear.?,??,? is such a section; as such, it is difficult to say just what Hume intended his argument to be. My contention in the present paper is that there are two reasonable ways of reconstructing Hume's argument, both consistent with what Hume writes in?,??,?. The first reconstruction is clearly unsound; the second reconstruction fares somewhat better. In particular, my contention will be that this second reconstruction, if not sound, is at least valid 4 and contains no obviously false premises. Allow me to make some preliminary comments before presenting these reconstructions. The reconstructions to follow will primarily be concerned with premise (P2) above; in particular, the 126. reconstructions will focus on how Hume can claim that (P2) follows from (Pl). Premise (Pl) is a common 5 sceptical claim, not obviously false, and certainly not unique to Hume. As such, it strikes me that the more interesting part of the argument is Hume's claim that (P2) follows from (Pl), and such will be the focus of the reconstructions (although (Pl) will be discussed toward the end of this paper). Concerning (P2), why does Hume think this follows from (Pl)? His reasoning is contained in the following passage; Having thus found in every probability, beside the original uncertainty inherent in the subject, a new uncertainty deriv'd from the weakness of that faculty, which judges, and having adjusted these two together, we are oblig'd by our reason to add a new doubt deriv'd from the possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth and fidelity of our faculties. This is a doubt, which immediately occurs to us, and of which, if we wou'd closely pursue our reason, we cannot avoid giving a decision. But this decision, tho' it shou'd be favourable to our preceeding judgment, being founded only on probability, must weaken still further our first evidence, and must itself be weaken'd by a fourth doubt of the same kind, and so on in infinitum; till at last there remain nothing of the original probability, however great we may suppose it to have been, and however small the diminution by every new uncertainty. No finite object can subsist under a decrease repeated in infinitum; and even the vastest quantity, which can enter into human imagination, must in this manner be reduc'd to nothing. (T182) Not for nothing did I claim that this section of the Treatise is unclear. At best, I can discern only the outline of Hume's reasoning, which seems to go as follows: first, when we assign a probability to some 127, proposition, reason dictates that we re-evaluate this probability. In particular, reason dictates that we "add a new doubt deriv'd from the possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth and fidelity of our faculties." Note that Hume never specifies the object of this 'new doubt.' He might mean a) that our doubt concerns whether the probability we assigned the proposition is correct, or b) that our doubt concerns the evidence on which we based the assignment of that probability. Whatever the case, this 'new doubt' must "weaken still further our first evidence," presumably resulting in a lowering of the probability we originally assigned to the proposition. We then repeat this doubting process, adding new doubts of the same kind in infinitum, "till at last there remain nothing of the original... (shrink)

Sogdians in China: Archaeological and Art Historical Analyses of Tombs and Texts from the 3rd to the 10th Century AD. By Patrick Wertmann. Archäologie in China / Archaeology in China and East Asia, vol. 5. Darmstadt: Philipp von Zabern, 2015. Pp. iv + 336, 116 plates. €86.

Traditional Turkish love is identified with suffering. This study investigates how suffering in love is metaphorically conceptualized in Turkish via natural phenomena and disasters. Based on figura...

Bu çalışmada “tabiat” kavramının sözlük ve terim anlamı analiz edilmiş ve ona ilişkin bazı Meşşâî İslam filozoflarının görüşlerine yer verilmiştir. “Tabiat” sözcüğünü karşılamak üzere Türkçede kullanılan “tabiat” ve “doğa” sözcükleri arasında bir karşılaştırma yapılmıştır. “Tabiat”ın Meşşâî İslam filozofları tarafından isim olarak kullanıldığı varlık alanı hakkında bilgi verilmiş ve İbn Sina ile İbn Rüşd arasında cereyan eden tabiatın ispatının gerekip gerekmeyeceği tartışmasına değinilmiştir. Cisimlerde görülen hareket ve sükunun kaynağı olması bakımından “tabiat”ın nelere delalet ettiği hususunda İbn Sina’nın görüşleri Aristo ile mukayeseli (...) olarak sunulmuştur. Daha sonra bir terim olarak “tabiat”ın filozoflar tarafından yapılan tanımı ortaya konulmuştur. İslam felsefesinde önemli bir yere sahip olan “tabiat” kavramına Meşşâî İslam filozoflarının yükledikleri anlam ve onu kullanma biçimleri, Aristo’dan farklıdır. Özellikle her türlü oluş ve hareketin kaynağını açıklamak amacıyla kullandıkları “tabiat” kavramı etimolojik açıdan tüm nedenleri Allah’a ulaştırmaya imkan sağlamaktadır. Ayrıca kavramın, “tabiat – tabiat ötesi” ayrımına dayanak teşkil ettiği de bilinmektedir. Makalenin amacı, “tabiat” kavramının günümüzde yeni teorilerle ilişkili olarak kullanılma imkanlarını belirginleştirmektir. (shrink)

Collection of the papers on language and globalization.

Cet article tente de montrer que la révolution qui s’est produite en Égypte était porteuse d’un projet politique libéral-démocrate. Les groupes révolutionnaires et les opposants au régime de Moubarak ont réussi à mobiliser des couches sociales substantielles en 2011 en demandant le respect des droits humains de base et la représentation de la volonté du peuple. La forte présence d’ouvriers mécontents, de classes moyennes appauvries et de populations urbaines défavorisées dans le mouvement de protestation n’a jamais débouché sur un projet (...) politique visant un changement économique et social. Leurs revendications sont restées figées dans une économie morale nassériste où les revendications économiques et sociales sont en grande partie apolitiques et totalement dissociées de la démocratisation des relations entre la société et l’État. L’absence de projet de changement socio-politique a privé le processus révolutionnaire d’une large et solide coalition sociale. (shrink)